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DOES MEDELLIN MATTER?
Janet Koven Levit*

INTRODUCTION

This Term's Medellin v. Texasl decision sent a shockwave through the
international legal community. Practitioners lament the decision's impact
on the United States' posture in treaty negotiations. 2 International legal
scholars fear a Medellin-driven presumption against automatic
enforceability of treaty obligations.3 Others conceive of Medellin as a blow
to judicial transnationalism. 4 Undoubtedly, Medellin creates a high,
5
exacting bar for judicial enforcement of treaty obligations.

* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law; Yale Law School (J.D.,
1994); Yale University (M.A., 1994); Princeton University (A.B., 1990). This essay is based
on the comments at the InternationalLaw and the Constitution: Terms of Engagement, The
Legitimacy of Delegating Lawmaking to InternationalInstitutions-TheInternationalCourt
of Justice and Foreign Nationals on Death Row Symposium panel at Fordham University
School of Law on October 5, 2007. I would like to thank Katherine Greubel Becker for her
invaluable research assistance.
1. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
2. Nina Totenberg, All Things Considered: States Not Subject to All Treaties, High
Court Rules (NPR radio broadcast Mar. 25, 2008) ("Many U.S. diplomats were dismayed.
Yale Law School Dean Harold Koh, who served as a State Department official in the Clinton
administration, said the decision would create havoc in diplomatic circles for some time to
come. 'If our international allies have no assurance that we're actually going to keep our
word, then they have much less incentive to keep their word when they're being obliged to
do something.' .. . Temple law professor Duncan Hollis, an expert on international law, said
that nonetheless, Tuesday's ruling will have practical consequences. Because enforcement
of some existing treaties may now be in doubt, negotiations over future treaties could be
more difficult ... ").
3. See,
e.g.,
Posting
of
Oona
Hathaway
to
Opinio
Juris,
http://opiniojuris.org/2008/03/26/medellin-v-texas-and-treaties-end/ (Mar. 26, 2008, 12:15
EDT); Posting of Paul Stephan to Opinio Juris, http://opiniojuris.org/2008/03/25/medellin-vtexas-modest-and-fairly-careful/ (Mar. 25, 2008, 14:43 EDT); Posting of Ernie Young to
Opinio
Juris,
http://opiniojuris.org/2008/03/25/medellin-v-texas-another-set-of-earlythoughts/ (Mar. 25, 2008, 16:36 EDT); see also Margaret E. McGuinness, Medellin v.
Texas: Supreme Court Holds ICJ Decisions Under the Consular Convention Not Binding
Federal Law, Rejects PresidentialEnforcement of ICJ Judgments over State Proceedings,
ASIL INSIGHTS, Apr. 17, 2008: Vol. 12 Issue 6, http://www.asil.org/insights0804l8.cfn.
4. See, e.g., Margaret E. McGuinness, Three Narratives of Medellin v. Texas, 31
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 227 (2008); Nina Totenberg, High Court Rejects Bush
Assertion on U.S. Treaties (NPR radio broadcast Mar. 26, 2008) (noting that the decision is
one about the status and enforceability of treaties in U.S. courts and that the decision could
have been one about executive power but instead focused on the standing (or lack thereof) of
international
law);
Posting
of
Eric
Posner
to
Convictions
blog,
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Yet, does Medellin really matter? Of course, for Jose Medellin and his
family, the answer is undoubtedly yes. On August 5, 2008, the U.S.
Supreme Court denied Mr. Medellin's request for a stay of execution, 6 and
the State of Texas executed Medellin that evening.
Yet, from the narrow perspective of enforcement of Vienna Convention
obligations, does the Medellin decision matter? This essay suggests that the
answer is no, at least not as much as the immediate scholarly hysteria
foreshadowed. Assuming that a goal of Medellin, and the litigation that
preceded it, was timely implementation of consular notification rights, 7 a
cursory survey of on-the-ground activity at the local, state, and
administrative levels suggests that the Medellin litigation indeed achieved
its ends in spite of the Supreme Court's rather cautiously chilly decision.
Medellin punctuates more than a decade of Vienna-Convention-based
litigation. During this time, critical touchpoints with detained foreign
nationals became increasingly conscious and observant of consular
notification rights. Thus, on the eve of Medellin, the United States, via a
web of local officials and private actors, was already quite compliant with
its Vienna Convention obligations. And the Court's decision in Medellin
will not reverse or undermine such compliance.
I. A TOP-DOWN VIEW: A DECADE OF VIENNA CONVENTION LITIGATION

The international law stories that scholars often tell are of a "top-down"
genre-they center on state elites who enact and interpret rules through
formal legal mechanisms. 8 Thus, a top-down story of Medellin rests on the
diplomats who negotiated the Vienna Convention and the judges, at the
state, federal and international level, who interpreted obligations under the
treaty. From a mile-high view, Medellin culminates over a decade of

http://www.slate.com/blogs/blogs/convictions/archive/2008/03/25/medellin-and-america-sability-to-comply-with-intemational-law.aspx (Mar. 25, 2008, 12:40 EST).
5. In determining whether a treaty is "self-executing" and thus directly enforceable in
U.S. courts, the U.S. Supreme Court resorts "to the text" of the treaty, thereby jettisoning the
multifactor, case-by-case contextual analysis that has, until Medellin, separated selfexecuting from non-self-executing treaties. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1362-63
(2008).
6. Medellin v. Texas, Nos. 06-984, 08-5573, 08-5574, 2008 WL 3821478 (U.S. Aug. 5,

2008) (per curium) (denying stay of execution); see James C. McKinley, Texas Executes
Mexican Despite Objectionsfrom Bush and InternationalCourt, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2008,
at A19.

7. While few would contest this assumption-that one of the goals of the Medellin
litigation is enforcement of consular notification rights-some argue that other goals were
dominant.

See,

e.g.,

Posting

of

Peggy

McGuinness

to

Opinio

http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/2008/03/25/medellin-its-about-the-death-penalty

Juris

blog,

(Mar. 25,

2008, 13:09 EDT).
8. See generally Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International
Lawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 125 (2005);
Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-Up Lawmaking Through a PluralistLens: The ICC Banking
Commission and the TransnationalRegulation of Letters of Credit, 57 EMORY L. REV. 1147

(2008).
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the United States into
foreign-government-prompted litigation to bring
9
compliance with Vienna Convention obligations.
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention provides that detaining officials
must inform a foreign national "without delay"' 10 of his right to request that
his consulate be informed of the detention;" 1 and foreign consulates must be
free to communicate with, visit, and/or arrange legal representation for
foreign nationals. 12 State parties to the Convention are obligated to give
"full effect"'13 to the aforementioned rights. Vienna Convention rights are
reciprocal, offering precious comfort to U.S. citizens when traveling
abroad, often to countries with criminal justice systems that offer less
procedural protections than our own. 14 Significantly for purposes of the
Medellin litigation, the Optional Protocol on Disputes, which the United
States ratified in 1969, anoints the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as the
arising out of the interpretation or
venue to consider all "[d]isputes
15
application" of the Convention.
The gravamen of the Medellin litigation stems from a gap between treaty
text and on-the-ground practice, exacerbated by a deeply entrenched
federalist system. In the United States, detaining officials are typically
members of state and local law enforcement agencies, and, historically,
these officials have not regularly informed foreign national detainees of
their Vienna Convention rights, primarily because international treaty
obligations are foreign to their day-to-day practice. By the time a foreign
national raises the Vienna Convention transgression, the criminal
prosecution often has progressed to a point where state procedural bar rules
(sometimes known as procedural default rules) impede a court's ability to
entertain Vienna Convention-related claims. Thus, in the United States,
courts often do not have the opportunity to contemplate Vienna Convention
violations and any concomitant prejudice to the foreign national.
Foreign states have become particularly angered when their foreign
nationals receive death sentences without being informed of their Vienna
Convention rights in a timely fashion, thereby spurring a flurry of Vienna
Convention-related litigation in the ICJ pursuant to the Optional Protocol.
On behalf of foreign nationals facing imminent death sentences, Paraguay
and Germany filed separate claims against the United States in the ICJ,
arguing prejudice on account of the United States' failure to notify
9. But see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
10. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes art.
36(1)(b), Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention and

Optional Protocol].
11. Id.

12. Id. arts. 36(1)(a), (c).
13. Id. art. 36(2).
14. See Editorial, A TravelAdvisory, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2005, at A20.
15. Vienna Convention and Optional Protocol, supra note 10, art. 1. U.S. Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice informed the Secretary General of the United Nations that the
United States would withdraw from the Optional Protocol on March 7, 2005. See Charles
Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases: Foes of Death Penalty Cite Access to Envoys,
WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2005, at Al.
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respective defendants of their rights to contact their consulates. 16 In each
case, the ICJ concluded that the U.S. had not complied with Article 36;17
yet, in each case the Supreme Court denied ultimate habeas relief to the
death row foreign nationals and thus did not give effect to the ICJ orders. 18
Again, in 2003, on behalf of approximately fifty defendants on death row
in various U.S. states, Mexico initiated the most recent challenge to the U.S.
Vienna Convention practices. 19 In the Case ConcerningAvena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States), the ICJ concluded that the
United States, in its arrest, detention, trial, and sentencing of the Mexican
nationals, had violated its obligations under the Vienna Convention, most
egregiously in its failure to notify these foreign nationals of their right to
contact the Mexican Consulate. 20 While Mexico argued that the conviction
and sentences in all of the cases should be annulled, 21 the ICJ determined
that the United States need only afford "review and reconsideration" to
determine the extent to which each particular defendant had been prejudiced

16. In 1993, the State of Virginia convicted Angel Francisco Breard, a Paraguayan
national, of attempted rape and capital murder and soon thereafter sentenced him to death.
Breard v. Commonwealth, 445 S.E.2d 670, 673 (Va. 1994). Breard had been procedurally
barred from raising the Vienna Convention issues at his habeas corpus proceedings. Breard
v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 1998). Paraguay argued in its April 3, 1998, International
Court of Justice (ICJ) petition that the United States violated the Vienna Convention on
account of the Virginia authorities' failure to notify Breard of his right to contact the
Paraguayan consulate; and consequently, Virginia should, among other things, stay the
scheduled April 14, 1998, execution pending an ICJ decision on the merits of Paraguay's
case. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Apr. 9).
Walter and Karl LaGrand were German nationals convicted in Arizona of first degree
murder, attempted armed robbery, and kidnapping. LaGrand Case (Ger. v.U.S.), 2001 I.C.J.
466, 475 (June 27). When the LaGrands raised their Vienna Convention rights in their
habeas corpus proceedings, the federal courts concluded that the LaGrands were
procedurally barred from doing so. LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 971 (1998). Karl LaGrand was executed on February 24, 1999, prompting
Germany to file its ICJ petition on March 2, 1999. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999
I.C.J. 9, 12 (Mar. 3).
17. On April 9, 1998, just five days before Breard's scheduled execution, the ICJ issued
a provisional order, asking the United States to stay the execution pending an ICJ decision
on the substantive Vienna Convention claims. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
1998 I.C.J. at 258. In the LaGrandCase (Germany v. United States), the ICJ concluded that
Arizona's procedural default rules violated the Vienna Convention because their application
precluded defendants from challenging their sentences even though the state officers had not
informed them of their consular protections. 2001 I.C.J. at 492, 497-98.
18. Following the ICJ's Breard provisional decision, the Supreme Court concluded that
while the Vienna Convention "arguably confers on an individual the right to consular
assistance following arrest," the ICJ's provisional order requesting a stay would not trump
either state or federal procedural default rules. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998);
see also Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999); McGuinness,
supra note 4.
19. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31). For
an excellent summary of the Avena decision, see Dinah L. Shelton, ICJ JurisdictionVienna Convention on Consular Relations-Diplomatic Protection-Reparations, in
InternationalDecisions, 98 Am. J.INT'L L. 559 (David D. Caron ed., 2004).
20. Avena and OtherMexican Nationals,2004 I.C.J. at 42-43, 46.
21 Id. at23.

2008]

DOES MEDELLIN MATTER?

The ICJ further
by the respective Vienna Convention violations. 22
to
concluded that procedural default rules violate the Vienna Convention
23
the extent that they preclude such review and reconsideration.
Medellin is one of the Mexican nationals named in Avena. In 1994,
despite the fact that no official informed Medellin of his Vienna
Convention-based right to contact the Mexican consul, 24 a Texas state court
convicted Medellin of two counts of rape and murder and sentenced him to
death. 25 Several years later, upon filing his state habeas petition, Medellin
argued for the first time that his death sentence and conviction should be
vacated on account of Texas state officials violating his Vienna Convention
rights.2 6 The state trial court, and later the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals, denied relief, concluding that Texas's contemporaneous objection
rule barred Medellin's Vienna Convention claim and further concluding
that the Vienna Convention did not grant individuals the right to raise
27
Vienna Convention claims to attack their sentences.
Medellin filed a federal habeas petition in November 2001 (amended in
2002), again raising Texas's failure to inform him of his right to contact the
Mexican Consulate as grounds for relief.28 On June 26, 2003, the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Texas rejected Medellin's Vienna
Convention-based arguments; 29 it also, sua sponte, denied Medellin a

22. Id. at 65 ("[W]hat is crucial in the review and reconsideration process is the
existence of a procedure which guarantees that full weight is given to the violation of the
rights set forth in the Vienna Convention, whatever may be the actual outcome of such
review and reconsideration.").
23. Id. Specifically, the ICJ stated that procedural default rules "may continue to
prevent courts from attaching legal significance to the fact, inter alia, that the violation of
the rights set forth in Article 36, paragraph 1, prevented Mexico, in a timely fashion, from
retaining private counsel for certain nationals and otherwise assisting in their defence." Id. at
57.
24. Jose Medellin informed the Texas officials that he was born in Laredo, Mexico, at
the time of his arrest. Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 675 (2005). Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor pointed out in her dissent, "Medellin was arrested, detained, tried, convicted, and
sentenced to death without ever being informed that he could contact the Mexican consul."
Id. at 675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Mexican consulate discovered Medellin only
because he wrote a letter from death row six weeks after his conviction was affirmed in the
state court system. Id.
25. Id. at 662.
26. See id.; Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 25-31, 45, Medellin v. State, No.
675430-A (Tex. Dist. Ct. Mar. 26, 1998).
27. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Medellin, 544 U.S. 660 (No. 04-5928). The dissent stated
that Medellin was "procedurally barred" from raising the Vienna Convention claims and, in
the alternative, that Medellin "lack[ed] standing to enforce" the Vienna Convention.
Medellin, 544 U.S. at 675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing the Texas District Court's
conclusions of law).
28. Medellin argued that that the LaGrand Case, decided a few months prior to filing his
habeas petition, "controls the interpretation of the Vienna Convention," Brief for Petitioner,
supra note 27, at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted), and that the federal courts are bound
by its conclusions: (1) that individuals may bring challenges under the Vienna Convention;
and (2) that procedural bar rules may not preclude such challenges, id. at 7-8.
29. Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 274 (5th Cir. 2004); Brief for Petitioner, supra
note 27, at 8.
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Certificate of Appealability (COA), a prerequisite to pursuing further
federal appeals under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA). 30 In October 2003, Medellin appealed the district court's denial
of a COA on several grounds, including the Vienna Convention claim. 3 1
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied Medellin relief,
concluding that Medellin was procedurally barred from raising the Vienna
Convention claim, in spite of the ICJ's intervening Avena decision. 32 Thus,
the Fifth Circuit's decision denied Medellin the review and reconsideration
that Avena explicitly demanded.
As Court-watchers anticipated, on December 10, 2004 the Supreme
Court granted Medellin's petition for a writ of certiorari to address the
Avena decision's legal status within the federal court system. 3 3 Medellin
did follow the rhythm of most Supreme Court cases-brief writing, oral
argument, decision. On February 28, 2005, President George W. Bush
ordered state courts to "give effect to" the Avena decision "in accordance
with general principles of comity." 34 On the basis of this memorandum,
30. Medellin, 371 F.3d at 274 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000)).
31. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 27, at 13.
32. Medellin, 371 F.3d at 280 (interpreting Breardas holding that "ordinary procedural
default rules can bar Vienna Convention claims").
33. Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 661-62 (2005).
34. Memorandum from George W. Bush, President, U.S., to Attorney Gen., U.S., on
Compliance with the Decision of the International Court of Justice in Avena, U.S. (Feb. 28,
2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html.
The memorandum states,
The United States is a party to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(the "Convention") and the Convention's Optional Protocol Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (Optional Protocol), which gives the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisdiction to decide disputes concerning the
"interpretation and application" of the Convention.
I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, that the United States
will discharge its inter-national obligations under the decision of the International
Court of Justice in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mexico v. United States of America) (Avena) by having State courts give effect to
the decision in accordance with general principles of comity in cases filed by the
51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision.
Id. (citation omitted). This memorandum surfaced as an attachment to the United States
amicus brief in the Medellin case (note that the Court granted certiorari even though it had
not reviewed the U.S. position in this case). Brief for U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Medellin, 544 U.S. 660 (No. 04-5928). The brief stated, "[Tihe President has
determined that the foreign policy interests of the United States in meeting its international
obligations and protecting Americans abroad require the ICJ's decision to be enforced
without regard to the merits of the ICJ's interpretation of the Vienna Convention." Id. at *48.
It went on to state,
[I]n light of the decision of the ICJ in Avena, the 51 named individuals may file a
petition in state court seeking such review and reconsideration, and the state courts
are to recognize the Avena decision. In other words, when such an individual
applies for relief to a state court with jurisdiction over his case, the Avena decision
should be given effect by the state court in accordance with the President's
determination that the decision should be enforced under general principles of
comity .... The authority of the President to determine the means by which the
United States will implement its international legal obligations is especially

20081
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Medellin filed a fresh habeas petition in the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals. 35 At this juncture, the Court chose not to decide Medellin,
issuing
36
a per curiam decision to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.
While the Texas courts contemplated Medellin's fresh habeas petition,
the Supreme Court ostensibly resolved one issue that it left pending in
Medellin. In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, a Vienna Convention case with
defendants who were neither in the Avena class nor on death row, the Court
concluded that Vienna Convention claims do not trump state procedural bar
rules. 37 With this "ammunition," the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
denied Medellin's pending
writ of habeas corpus on the basis of the
38
President's memorandum.
The Court again granted certiorari in Medellin, poised to answer the two
looming questions that the course of the litigation raised: (1) the legal
effect of the Avena ruling in state courts; and (2) the legal effect of the
President's memorandum requiring state courts to "give effect" to the
Avena decision. 39 In this Term's decision, the Court ultimately concluded
that neither state courts nor federal courts are bound by the ICJ's decision in
Avena because the treaties which undergird the decision-the Optional
Protocol 40 and Article 94 of the UN Charter 4 1-are "non-self-executing"
and thus do not constitute "directly enforceable federal law" that preempt
"state restrictions on the filing of successive habeas petitions." 4 2 These
treaties are "non-self-executing" because Congress has not enacted any
"implementing legislation" and because the treaties under scrutiny are not
43
explicitly (by the terms of their text and/or ratification) self-executing.
The Court also concluded that the President does not have the independent
authority to order state courts to "discharge" the United States' obligations
44
under Avena.

important in the context of a treaty, like the Vienna Convention, that not only
protects foreign nationals in this country, but also protects Americans overseas.
Id. at *42.
35. Medellin, 544 U.S. at 662.
36. The Court initially reasoned that "new developments," presumably the President's
memorandum and the pending Texas state court habeas petition on the basis of Avena and
the memorandum, "may provide Medellin with the review and reconsideration of his Vienna
Convention claim that the ICJ required." Id. at 664.
37. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 337, 346-52 (2006). See generally Janet
Koven Levit, Medellin v. Dretke: Another Chapter in the Vienna Convention Narrative, 41
TULSA L. REv. 193 (2005).
38. Exparte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
39. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-

984).
40. See Vienna Convention and Optional Protocol, supra note 10.
41. U.N. Charter art. 94.
42. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1353, 1367 & n.13.

43. Id. at 1357.
44. Id. at 1367-72.
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While the Medellin litigation persists in its ninth life, 4 5 the Supreme
Court ostensibly resolved the legal issues at its core in a way that privileges
domestic procedural rules vis-d-vis international treaty obligations. Thus
Medellin and Vienna Convention obligations lose; state courts win.
Viewing Medellin from the top down, U.S. courts now offer scant remedies
for aggrieved foreign nationals, and the Vienna Convention's consular
notification provisions retain little, if any, bite within the United States.
II. CONSULAR NOTIFICATION:

A VIEW FROM THE GROUND UP

In this top-down account, Medellin reifies national/state rules in the face
of "trespassing" treaty obligations. Medellin is thus a "knock out" to the
ICJ's institutional standing and a reaffirmation of American dualism,
disentangling the domestic legal system from the international. 46 From this
vantage point, as Article 36 has no direct domestic effect and Vienna
Convention "rights" are "hollow," plagued by a problem endemic to
international law-lack of a "real" enforcement mechanism-foreign
national detainees should not expect routine consular notification.
Paradoxically, the opposite appears to be true in local practice. In Tulsa,
Oklahoma, for instance, foreign national detainees in federal custody
routinely receive consular notification prior to their first appearance, which
occurs within twenty-four hours of detention. 47 For those detained in the
state system, the sheriffs office notifies the detainee upon booking at the
local jail. 48 So, at the very moment that the Supreme Court concluded that
Article 36 has no "automatic domestic legal effect," the effects are quite
49
palpable, in fact transcendent.
Why the disconnect? The answer lies in the poverty of top-down
accounts of international lawmaking, as these accounts ignore the not-soglamorous underbrush and thus discount all that transpires on-the-ground,
in-the-trenches. Instead, I offer a bottom-up story, centering on nonjudicial
actors, particularly at the state and local level, who, for a variety of
reasons-some completely unrelated to Vienna Convention litigationprogressively institutionalize consular notification practices. While a
comprehensive review of on-the-ground consular notification practices is
45. Unofficial Press Release, Int'l Court of Justice, Request for Interpretation of the
Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mexico v. United States of America): Conclusion of the Public Hearings on Mexico's
Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures (June 20, 2008), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/1 39/14598.pdfPHPSESSID=03600872d3f9abcd0a09670

d22963981.
46. See generally Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward
Interpretive Incorporationof Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 628 (2007).

47. Telephone interview with Joseph Wilson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's
Office for the N. Dist. of Okla., in Tulsa, Okla. (June 6, 2008).
48. Interview with Honorable William Kellough, Judge, Tulsa County Court, in Tulsa,
Okla. (June 12, 2008); Interview with Sue Snider, Deputy, Tulsa County Sheriffs Office, in
Tulsa, Okla. (June 12, 2008).

49. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1356.
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beyond the scope of this essay, I offer an initial glimpse, based on a series
of interviews in Tulsa County, Oklahoma, 50 as well as publicly available
sources. So, as the heady constitutional issues at the heart of Medellin
worked their way through the system, what was happening in places like
Tulsa Oklahoma?
A. FederalAdministrative Agencies
First, local law enforcement officials receive periodic visits from the U.S.
Department of State. The State Department, with a diplomatic corps spread
throughout the globe, understands that its employees (diplomats) are a
primary beneficiary of Vienna Convention rights when abroad; thus, the
State Department has a strong stake in the integrity of the Vienna
Convention. James Lawrence-a young Vienna Convention missionary
who is the Public Affairs Director of the State Department's Consular
Notification and Outreach Division-routinely visits local police
departments, sheriff departments, and state attorney general offices, as well
as a myriad of law enforcement trade associations, 5 1 to offer intensive
Vienna Convention education. 52 This Outreach Division has distributed
53
over one million pieces of consular notification instructional material,
including: flow charts that essentially map the Vienna Convention
requirements; model procedures and protocols that local law enforcement
agencies can adopt; a Consular Notification and Access Reference Card that

50. Interview with Mark Cagel, Assistant Pub. Defender, Tulsa County Pub. Defenders
Office, in Tulsa, Okla. (June 11, 2008); Interview with Barry Derryberry, U.S. Fed.
Defenders Office, N. Dist. Okla., in Tulsa, Okla. (June 25, 2008); Interview with Honorable
Sam Joyner, Magistrate Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Okla., in Tusla, Okla.
(June 6, 2008); Interview with Honorable William Kellough, supra note 48; Interview with
Bill Mussman, Assistant Dist. Attorney, Tulsa County Dist. Attorney's Office, in Tulsa,
Okla. (June 12, 2008); Interview with Honorable Millie Otey, Judge, Tulsa County Court, in
Tulsa, Okla. (June 10, 2008); Interview with Honorable Robert Perugino, Judge, Tulsa
County Court, in Tulsa, Okla. (June 3, 2008); Interview with Sue Snider, supra note 48;
Interview with David Sobel, private practice, in Tulsa, Okla. (June 11, 2008); Interview with
Van Stevens, Immigration & Customs Enforcement Officer, Tulsa County Sheriffs Office,
in Tulsa, Okla. (June 12, 2008).
51. Such trade associations include:
American Correctional Association,
http://www.aca.org (last visited Oct. 9, 2008); American Jail Association, http://www.aja.org
(last visited Oct. 9, 2008); American Probation and Parole Association, http://www.appanet.org (last visited Oct. 9, 2008); International Association of Chiefs of Police,
http://www.theiacp.org (last visited Oct. 9, 2008); National Organization of Black
Enforcement Executives, http://www.noblenatl.org (last visited Oct. 9, 2008); National
Sheriffs' Association, http://www.sheriffs.org (last visited Oct. 9, 2008).
52. James Lawrence, a public affairs specialist, is charged with traveling the United
States to train and educate more than 700,000 local law enforcement officials in 19,000
jurisdictions on consular notification matters. Interview with James A. Lawrence, Pub.
Affairs Specialist, Consular Notification & Outreach Div., U.S. Dep't of State, in Wash.,
D.C. (Jan. 5, 2006).
53. U.S. Dep't of State, Working to Advance CNA Awareness & Compliance, State
Department Activities to Advance Consular Notification and Access Awareness and
Compliance, http://www.travel.state.gov/law/consular/consular2244.html (last visited Oct. 9,
2008).
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provides a Miranda-esque script that law enforcement officials can use
upon detaining a foreign national; translation of a consular notification
script into thirteen languages; phone numbers and addresses for consulates
throughout the U.S.; and training videos. 54 In Tulsa, Oklahoma, local law
enforcement agencies have incorporated some of these State Department
55
roadmaps into policy and practice.
Second, attendant to federal efforts to heightened enforcement of
immigration laws, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security now prompts
local law enforcement agencies to institutionalize "booking" processes that
identify a detainee's immigration status, which includes clarifying place of
birth. 56 In the past, local law enforcement officials were hesitant to inquire
about immigration status or place of birth because of legal ambiguities
'surrounding racial profiling. Thus, a consequence, perhaps unintended, of
Homeland Security initiatives is a regularization, through immigrationrelated paperwork (i.e., questions regarding place of birth), of practices that
facilitate notification of consular rights. Furthermore, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials have assumed a greater presence in
local jails, and ICE officials are armed with a form known as the 1-826,
"Notice of Rights
and Request for Disposition," which is a type of consular
57
notification.
B. Subnational Governments: States andMunicipalities
State and local governments play a critical, but often overlooked, role in
the making and implementing of international law. 5 8 Indeed, parallel to
Vienna Convention litigation, some state legislatures incorporated Article
54. See generally U.S. Department of State, Consular Notification and Access,
http://travel.state.gov/law/consular/consular_753.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2008); Consular
Notification & Access (U.S. Department of State CD-ROM, Sept. 2005) (on file with
author); U.S. Department of State, Consular Notification and Access: Instructions for
Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement and Other Officials Regarding Foreign Nationals
in the United States and the Rights of Consular Officials to Assist Them,
http://travel.state.gov/consul-notify.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2008); U.S. Dep't of State,
Arresting a Non-U.S. Citizen:
Consular Notification Process, available at
http://travel.state.gov/pdf/CNAFlowcolor.pdf.
55. See infra apps. I & 2 (documents are a verbatim replica of State Department
materials). Beyond Tulsa, Oklahoma, State Department materials have a formative impact
on local practices. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 834c(a)(2) (West 2006) ("The law
enforcement official who receives the notification request pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be
guided by his or her agency's procedures in conjunction with the Department of State
Guidelines Regarding Foreign Nationals Arrested or Detained in the United States .... ");
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. OF TEX., MAGISTRATE'S GUIDE TO THE VIENNA CONVENTION

ON CONSULAR NOTIFICATIONS (2006), available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us/AG-Publicat

ions/pdfs/vienna-guidebook.pdf.
56. See Interview with Van Stevens, supranote 50.
57. See Dep't of Homeland Sec., Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien, Form 1-213
(on file with author); Dep't of Homeland Sec., Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Notice of Rights and Request for Disposition, Form 1-826 (on file with author).
58. See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky & Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of Networks?: Local
Climate Change Coalitions, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 409 (2008); see also, e.g., Gerald E. Frug &
David J. Barron, InternationalLocal Government Law, 38 URB. LAW. 1 (2006).

2008]

DOES MEDELL[N MATTER?

36 into penal codes, although Oklahoma's legislature has not yet done so.
California, for instance, requires "every peace officer, upon arrest and
booking.., for more than two hours of a known or suspected foreign
to
national" to "advise the foreign national that he or she has a right
59
communicate with an official from the consulate of his or her country.
In other states, administrative agencies, rather than legislatures, have
Offices of State Attorneys General heighten law
taken the lead.
enforcement community awareness of their Vienna Convention obligations.
Most notably the Texas Attorney General's office (Medellin's state) widely
disseminates a guide to consular notification, 60 and many states borrow
heavily from this guide. 6 1 The Oklahoma Law Enforcement, Education,
and Training Council, a quasi-public entity, offers live and online
officers; one training video is
continuing education to law enforcement
62
notification.
consular
to
dedicated
Additionally, due to stricter enforcement of immigration laws, as well as
the growth of the foster care system in many states, minor foreign nationals
often fall into the custody of human services and/or child welfare agencies.
These agencies regularly enter into Memorandums of Understanding
(MOUs) with the government of Mexico that provide, in part, that such
agencies will afford minors Vienna Convention protections and contact the
respective consulate when a minor falls into their custody. 63 These MOUs
59. CAL. PENAL CODE § 834c(a)(1).

60. See MAGISTRATE'S GUIDE TO THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR
NOTIFICATIONS, supra note 55.
61. IND. SUPREME COURT, IMMIGRATION ISSUES ARISING IN INDIANA CRIMINAL COURTS,
available at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/center/education/library/criminal/immigration/
issues.pdf (citing the Magistrate's Guide prominently in developing discussion of Vienna
Convention).
62. See Oklahoma Council on Law Enforcement Education and Training (CLEET),
Consular Notification, http://www.ok.gov/cleet/ContinuingContinuing Education:
Education/ContinuingEducation_-_UserLogin -. CE Courses/index.html (last visited Oct.
9, 2008).
63. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the State of Iowa
of the United States of America and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Mexican
States Regarding Consular Notification and Access in Cases Involving Minors, Iowa
Department of Human Services, May 4, 2007, availableat http://www.dhs.state.ia.us/policy
Nebraska
analysis/PolicyManualPages/ManualDocuments/Master/i 7-C3%20T I2.pdf.
signed a similar memorandum a few months prior to Iowa. Memorandum from Todd
Reckling, Protection & Safety Admin'r, Office of Protection & Safety, Neb. Health &
Human Servs. Sys., to Holders of Title 390 (Feb. 6, 2006); see also Memorandum of
Understanding Between the State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services
and the Consulate General of Mexico in Chicago Regarding Consular Notification and
8,
2007,
available at
Minors,
Nov.
in
Cases
Involving
Access
http://www.f2f.ca.gov/res/pdf/IllinoisMOUMexicanConsulate.pdf. County governments, in
lieu of the state, have also entered into these memoranda of understanding. See, e.g.,
Memorandum of Understanding Between the County of Sacramento on Behalf of the
Department of Health and Human Services, Child Protective Services Division and the
July
1, 2005, available at
California,
Consulate,
Sacramento,
Mexican
Memorandum of
http://www.f2f.ca.gov/res/pdf/SacramentoMOUMexicanConsulate.pdf;
Understanding Between the Consulate General of Mexico in San Diego, California and the
County of San Diego Health and Human Services Agency, State of California of the United
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consider the treatment of minor foreign nationals in state custody, often
creating detailed processes for identifying foreign nationals and
standardizing notification processes. 64 Consular notification processes that
gel to protect children in state custody inevitably impact workflow, paper
trails, and general consciousness in a broader sphere.
C. Public Servants: U.S. Attorneys, Public Defenders, and Private
Lawyers
The criminal defense bar has become increasingly sensitized to Vienna
Convention missteps, and thus the anecdotal rate of procedural default
appears to be decreasing. Treatise materials implore all federal public
defenders to raise Vienna Convention transgressions at trial. 65 And public
defenders acknowledge that they are "on the lookout" for consular
notification (or the failure thereof).66
In federal cases, the Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) actually serves as
the backstop for consular notification. 67 If detaining officials-sheriffs,
police, detectives-overlook notification, the AUSA notifies the foreign
national of his or her rights and sends a standard fax to respective
68
consulates when detainees make such requests.
The American Bar Association's Guidelines for Defense Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases deploy appointed private counsel to protect Vienna
Convention rights, calling upon counsel to: (1) "make appropriate efforts"
to determine whether the client is indeed a foreign national; (2) "advise the
client of his or her right to communicate with the relevant consular office";
and (3) "obtain the consent" to contact the consulate and, upon receiving
such consent, "immediately contact the client's consular office." '69

States of America Regarding Consular Assistance in Cases of Custody Involving Mexican
Minors,

Apr.

30,

2008,

available

at

http://www.f2f.ca.gov/res/pdf/SanDiego

MOUMexicanConsulate.pdf, Memorandum of Understanding Between the Monterey
County Department of Social and Employment Services, Family and Children Services and
the Consulate General of Mexico in San J6se, California Regarding Consular Involvement in
Cases

Involving

Minors,

2007,

available at http://www.f2f.ca.gov/res/pdf/Monterey

MOUMexicanconsulate.pdf; Memorandum of Understanding on Consular Protection of
Mexican Nationals Between the County of Riverside Department of Public Social Services,
California, and the Consulate of Mexico in San Bernardino, California, available at
http://www.f2f.ca.gov/res/pdf/RiversideMOUMexicanConsulate.pdf.
64. See ILL. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERES., POLICY GUIDE 2004.02: MEXICAN
CONSULATE NOTIFICATION OF MEXICAN OR MEXICAN AMERICAN MINORS IN THE CUSTODY OF
THE DEPARTMENT (2004) (on file with author).
65. FED. DEFENDERS OF E. WASH. & IDAHO, PRACTICE GUIDE FOR DEFENDING A FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CASE 285 (2001).
66. See Interview with Barry Derryberry, supra note 50.
67. See Interview with Honorable Sam Joyner, supra note 50.
68. Id.
69. AM. BAR ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE
COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, 1012-14 (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org
/deathpenalty/resources/docs/2003Guidelines.pdf.
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D. Nongovernmental Actors: Think Tanks and Trade Associations

In addition to serving as a conduit for efficient dissemination of Vienna
Convention educational materials, trade associations illuminate best
practices and set minimum standards for their membership. 70 For instance,
the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies has
recently added a "consular notification and access standard" to their
71
accreditation standards for local law enforcement.
The Pegasus Research Foundation answered Congress's post-9/11 charge
to enhance security and preparedness by creating a local-to-local data
communications network which will enable local law enforcement officials
to "talk to each other." 72 In creating such a system, the Pegasus Research
Foundation has developed electronic consular notification functionality as
an "add on," thereby giving local law enforcement agencies who subscribe
to the electronic database capability to fulfill Vienna Convention
73
obligations.
E. ForeignGovernments
Beyond litigating Avena, the government of Mexico is waging a
concerted political, diplomatic and economic campaign on behalf of its
nationals. As noted above, 74 while the courts contemplated the Vienna
Convention, Mexico signed MOUs with myriad state and local

governmental agencies reinforcing its protections.

Consistent language

from MOU to MOU suggests that the constant party-Mexico-choreographed this MOU strategy. Additionally, at various stages of the
litigation, Mexico allegedly threatened targeted economic protests, aimed
particularly at those states whose courts (and then governors) ignore
75
Avena.

70. See, e.g., supra note 51 and accompanying text.
71. Working
to
Advance
CNA
Awareness
&
Compliance,
http://www.travel.state.gov/law/consular/consular_2244.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2008)
(noting that the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies recently
published a "consular notification and access standard in their 5th Edition of the 'Standards
for Law Enforcement Agencies,"' which requires all agencies to "draft a written directive
governing procedures for ensuring compliance with the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations"); see also Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies,
http://www.calea.org (last visited Oct. 9, 2008).
72. LEE COLWELL, PEGASUS RESEARCH FOUND., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
THE LOCAL-TO-LOCAL (L2L) INFORMATION EXCHANGE NEEDS & REQUIREMENTS OF THE
NATION'S LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (2005), available at http://www.pegasus

research.org/2005 AnnualReportjto Congress.pdf.
73. U.S. Dep't. of State, Working to Advance CNA Awareness & Compliance, State
Department Activities to Advance Consular Notification and Access Awareness and
Compliance, http://www.travel.state.gov/law/consular/consular_2244.html (last visited Oct.
9, 2008).
74. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
75. C.f.Paul English, Death-Penalty Foes Plead with Henry to Spare Mexican's Life,
TULSA WORLD, May 13, 2004, at A17. My personal involvement in the matters described
herein have led me to believe that these threats were made.
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F. Bottom- Up Lawmaking: TransnationalLegal Progress
Local law enforcement practices stand at the confluence of these foreign,
federal, state, local, and private initiatives, and the ensuing empirical
evidence belies the pessimism that Medellin spawned.
Local law
enforcement operating procedures now routinely incorporate Vienna
Convention obligations, often creating roadmaps and consular notification
forms that functionally translate treaty requirements, stated in diplomatic
legalese, into on-the-ground practice. 76
In Tulsa County, early
"touchpoints" in a foreign national's detention-sheriffs, detectives, and
magistrates-follow protocols
and checklists that include Vienna
77
Convention-related questions.
Why the disjuncture between the Court's palpable hostility toward the
Vienna Convention in Medellin and the accommodating attitudes on the
ground by those who grapple with consular notification day in and day out?
In my view, the Court's pronouncement happened too far into the consular
notification tale to have significant consequence. The top-down story of
Supreme Court and ICJ decisions, a story that international legal scholars
are often quick to tell, is unidimensional and woefully inadequate to capture
the complex dynamics that Vienna Convention litigation sparked. The
decade-plus volley within the judicial echelon-the volley that is at the
heart of top-down accounts-unleashed irrepressible forces, triggering
transnational dialogue and energizing multiple state, local, and private
actors. A bottom-up account thus reveals that, by the time the Court issued
Medellin, a core goal of Vienna Convention litigation, compliance, had
been met. The complex, intertwined, and self-reinforcing nature of the web
that undergirds such compliance suggests that the decision will. not spark a
reversal.
CONCLUSION

While Medellin may have limited consequence, its backdrop nonetheless
reveals much about international law and lawmaking. International law is
not a snapshot; it is an interactive process. This simple, almost self-evident
conclusion has been at the fulcrum of international scholarship for

76. See, e.g.,

ROBERT

C.

WHITE,

STANDARD

OPERATING

PROCEDURES

FOR THE

LoUISVILLE METRO POLICE DEPARTMENT, No. 10.4.5 (2005) ("Upon knowingly arresting a
foreign national, officers shall ... [i]mmediately advise the foreign national of his right to

consular notification."); see also Michael Ramage, Emerging Immigration Issues for Local
Law Enforcement: A Presentation to the International Association of Chiefs of Police Legal
Officers Section (Sept. 25, 2005), available at http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/OGC/Seminar/5
Flnfo%5F%20et%5F%20al/IACP2005%20(2).doc ("Make sure your troops know of the
obligation to notify foreign consul whenever ANY foreign national is detained or arrested.

Have a policy in place and assure your agency follows it.").
77. See, e.g., Interview with Sue Snider, supra note 48; see also infra app. I (including a

checklist of documents that must be included in files for those who are booked at the Tulsa
County Jail).
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decades. 78 Yet, scholars and practitioners tend to celebrate the role of
traditional elites-diplomats, judges, presidents.
What this essay
emphasizes is the role of a myriad of actors who do not adorn headlinesinstead, they are those who roll up their sleeves and grapple with the nittygritty mechanics of detaining, booking, and notifying foreign nationals of
their Vienna Convention rights. Thus, international law emerges as a
multidimensional, multidirectional process, emanating not only from the
top down but also from the bottom up. To focus on "top-down" Vienna
Convention litigation, on the Court's ultimate decision in Medellin, without
also contemplating all that is transpiring on the ground level, is to paint a
woefully incomplete picture and to skew scholarly and advocacy endeavors.
Medellin indisputably closed the courthouse doors to many Vienna
Convention claims. Yet, while Vienna Convention litigation made its way
through various international, national, and state courts, public awareness of
reciprocal Vienna Convention obligations grew, and nonjudicial actors
began institutionalizing processes that effectively cured Vienna Convention
transgressions. Medellin will not reverse all that has solidified in the
underbrush-from police department checklists to consular notification
functionality in law enforcement databases. For the most part, officials now
notify foreign nationals of consular rights. Thus, consular notification
happens whether the Supreme Court demands it or not. And, while scholars
will undoubtedly parse and debate Medellin, from the perspective of Vienna
Convention compliance, it is a decision that may simply not matter.

78. This "international law as process" approach has deep theoretical roots, beginning
with Harold D. Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal's New Haven School of International Law
and a number of groundbreaking works by McDougal and W. Michael Reisman. MYREs S.
McDOUGAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW, POWER, AND POLICY:

A CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTION

(1953); Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, The PrescribingFunction in World
Constitutive Process: How InternationalLaw Is Made, 6 YALE STUD. INWORLD PUB. ORD.
249 (1980); Myres S. McDougal et al., The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative
Decision, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 253 (1967); W. Michael Reisman, InternationalLawmaking: A
Process of Communication, 75 AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. PROCS. 101, 107 (1981). It evolved
into Dean Harold Koh's more contemporary Transnational Legal Process School. See Harold
Hongju Koh, TransnationalLegal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 183-84 (1996); Harold
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2626 (1997)

(reviewing

ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); THOMAS M. FRANCK,

FAIRNESS ININTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995)).
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APPENDIX 1

WORK FOLDER
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ompleUto a Work

Foldcr, check off once each step h[ been done.
* USE ONlY 91 1SF INK ON ALL iMMIRATION FORMS
AND DOCUMENTS.
*

._ _

*

___

IMACS One Scroxr
Scrtci 1-213
Notice of RIghts (I-26)

Staemnt to be providud 1.0
dcttinedrorcigu National
JAFIS aid IDENT search icsponses (All iliens are, to
(
;
rolled.) [3 TA:S
, ___ CIS response
* __. NCIC response
Legal Service PrtVixdcr (1-6 1X)To be signed by Afica
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• -_ Consular Notification (Cne.cod)e.
* ...
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A&B
S....
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..
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SLupervisoryt. R'e
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Comncnts or additional infornation:

_ .. Date:-.......
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STATEMENT TO BE PROVIDED TO ARRESTED OR DETAINED FOREIGN
NATIONAl,
ENGLISH
You arc entiled to have uisnotify your country's consular representatives here in t]le
United States. A consular official from your country may be able to help you obtain lcgal
counsel and aty CnaSCt your faniily Lind visit you in detention, among other things. If
you want us to iiotit your country's consular officials, you can reqtc-t this notifiation
now, or at any Line in the fAture. After your consular otficials a-e notitied, they may call
or vis it'You.
nDo yuu wo t us to nutiry your country's capsular officials?
Y ES
"ll_

astwd tien drecho a perdiros qut nofijrqueros oobre scudnictcion a lo
rcpresentantes consulares de su pais aqui cii Los Pstadns Un idos, si todeserl. Ademas de
otrrus COSLS, un funciVariad su pais puede ayidarle a obteaer representacion legal,
ponerse en cntacto con su farnilia, y visitatlo en la cares. Si usted desea que
notiflquLmos alconsutado de su pals, alluK podran Iluraarlu o visitaric.
Deses que notifiquemos at vansulado de %u pais?

Naeno I Nombre
Signature I Firma
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